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MINES RESCUE GUIDELINES: THE NEXT GENERATION 
Geoff Nugent1, Seamus Devlin2, John Grieves3,  
David Cliff4 and Darren Brady5 
ABSTRACT: The procedures under which the coal mining industry based mines rescue organisations 
for Queensland and New South Wales operate have been developed over many years of challenging 
training, exercises, rescues, recoveries and, sadly, fatalities. The New South Wales Mines Rescue 
Service and the Queensland Mines Rescue Service are working together to underpin their operating 
procedures and guidelines with risk management logic while taking heed of lessons from the past. The 
initial focus for this undertaking is a crucial aspect of mines rescue operations: the emergency mine 
entry and re-entry. A three-phase process is being used for the development of new guidelines for 
emergency mine entry and re-entry to facilitate integration with operations’ emergency response 
systems and day-to-day operations. The first phase is the assessment of risks and determination of 
appropriate controls for Rescue Services effecting a mine entry or re-entry. The second phase is the 
conversion of the risk assessment into the practical guidelines ("Emergency Mine Entry and Re-entry 
Guidelines"), capturing the necessary controls identified in the risk assessment. The third phase is 
converting the guidelines into systems that mining operations and mines rescue organisations alike, 
together with other key industry stakeholders (the Inspectorate, Industry Safety and Health 
Representatives, Industry Check Inspectors etc), can use for effecting mine entry or mine re-entry 
responses. A particular emphasis in this third phase is the collection and analysis of information in a 
timely manner and appropriate format to support decision makers, technical support and crews 
effecting responses. While these efforts focus on the mines rescue organisation provided services and 
emergency responses, it is clear there are benefits for operations in having systems ready to support 
the Emergency Mine Entry and Re-entry Guidelines, as there are significant overlaps between 
information required for most types of emergency responses involving mines rescue organisations and 
the information operations require in managing their principal hazards. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mines rescue organisations have been in existence in Australia for 100 years. The development of 
these organisations, and the protocols under which they respond to incidents, has been driven by 
experiences in response to a range of incidents and the development of new technologies. 
 
The New South Wales and Queensland coal mining industries have embraced risk management logic 
into their legislation and safety cultures. This is equally reflected in the training and response to 
emergencies under the guidelines used by the New South Wales and Queensland mines rescue 
organisations. Despite this, the guidelines have until recently not been the subject of a comprehensive, 
formal risk assessment process. 
 
The underground coal mining industry internationally has had many emergency response experiences, 
ranging from minor incidents through to significant disasters, where investigations of the events 
indicated significant improvements could have been made in the emergency response. A common 
theme in many of these investigations is that the emergency response, and ultimately the outcomes, 
could have been considerably enhanced by the implementation of appropriate systems for: the 
collection and interpretation of appropriate data and information; and the management of the obtained 
knowledge for decision making. 
 
The clear link is that for a response to be effective, those making decisions regarding the appropriate 
response in an emergency must have adequate information, supplied in a timely manner and suitable 
format. 
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MINES RESCUE ORGANISATIONS 
Queensland 
 
Mines Rescue in Queensland 
 
2009 marks the centenary of mines rescue organisations in Australia. With coal mining expanding on 
the West Moreton field (surrounding Ipswich, Queensland), the then Queensland Department of Mines 
initiated the establishment of a Mines Rescue Brigade in November 1909 (Hanrahan, 2009). The 
Department suggested that three miners from each mine be trained in first-aid and rescue methods. 
Three committees appointed soon after considered: appropriate premises for rescue apparatus; 
appropriate methods for affording instruction to the colliers who may become honorary members of the 
brigade; and the smoke helmets best adapted for the district.  
 
In 1910, four coal miners (who had been members of the Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigade) 
and six new volunteers made up a ten man team to undergo a course of instruction in first-aid and the 
use of rescue apparatus. They became the first formal mines rescue team in Australasia (Strang and 
Mackenzie-Wood, 1993). 
 
In 1912, a Rescue Station was erected at North Ipswich on the property of the Ambulance Brigade. The 
first permanent rescue instructor (who had trained in rescue in Britain) was appointed this same year 
(Hanrahan, 2009). The first fully equipped Mines Rescue Station was subsequently built at Booval 




The Queensland Mining Act Amendment Act of 1920 made a formal, legislated provision for the 
establishment of a rescue organisation in Queensland (Strang and Mackenzie-Wood, 1990), which 
carried into the (now repealed) Coal Mining Act 1925. Key in the repealed legislation was not only the 
need to establish a rescue brigade to afford assistance in the case of emergency in any coal mine, but 
also to ensure that through the brigade at all times there would be available a sufficient number of 
suitably qualified and trained persons suitably equipped to allow the brigade to properly discharge its 
function (Queensland Government, 1996). 
 
In 1997 the Queensland Coal Legislation Amendment Act 1997 amended the Coal Mining Act 1925 and 
fundamentally changed the relationship between the then Queensland Mines Rescue Brigade and the 
coal mine operators. This legislation made each coal mine operation responsible for the provision of a 
mines rescue capability and for being party to an agreement with an accredited corporation 
(Queensland Government, 1999). The accredited corporation had the function of providing “mines 
rescue services”, including: helping each underground mine operator to provide a mines rescue 
capability; providing underground mines rescue training programs; and providing adequate and 
appropriate staff and equipment (Queensland Government, 1999). These legislative provisions 
continued, with some extensions and minor modification, into the current Coal Mining Safety and Health 
Act 1999. 
 
The Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 defines a mines rescue capability as “the ability to provide 
a suitable number of trained persons and maintained equipment to allow continuous rescue operations 
to take place and to help the escape or safe recovery of anyone from a mine if it has, or may have, an 
irrespirable atmosphere” (Section 221, Queensland Government, 2009a). 
 
While the legislation clearly places responsibility on operations for their mines rescue capability, 
Section 174(d) of the Queensland Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 places responsibility 
on the accredited corporation for developing appropriate mines rescue procedures: “A mines rescue 
agreement for an underground mine must state the operational procedures developed by the 
accredited corporation to be followed by the corporation in carrying out the mines rescue services at the 
mine” (Queensland Government, 2009b). 
 
Queensland Mines Rescue Services Limited was formed in 1998 and remains the only corporation 
accredited under the mines rescue provisions in Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999. The head 
office for Queensland Mines Rescue Services Limited is located at Dysart, Queensland, with stations at 
Dysart and Blackwater. 
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New South Wales 
 
Mines Rescue in New South Wales 
 
Strang and Mackenzie-Wood (1990) note no organised rescue facilities were available for disasters at 
the Bulli Colliery (Illawarra District, NSW, 1887), Mount Kembla (Illawarra District, NSW, 1902), 
Stanford Merthyr Colliery (South Maitland, NSW, 1902) and Bellbird Colliery (South Maitland, NSW, 
1923). 
 
After the Bellbird Colliery disaster, breathing apparatus had been used at several incidents. The 
continuing public reaction to the Bellbird Disaster, together with confidence gained in the use of 
breathing apparatus during the re-entry operations, prompted the New South Wales Government to 
introduce legislation to enable the establishment of a mines rescue station in the four coal mining 
districts (Strang and Mackenzie-Wood, 1993): South Maitland (Abermain), Newcastle (Boolaroo), 
Southern (Bellambi) and Western Coalfields (Lithgow) (Mines Rescue Board NSW, 1999). The South 
Maitland Rescue station has since moved to Singleton and has been renamed the Hunter Valley Mines 
Rescue Station. 
 
New South Wales Legislation 
 
The New South Wales Mines Rescue Act 1925 was passed subsequent to the Bellbird Colliery disaster 
and provided for mines rescue stations being established in the four main coal mining districts. The 
regulations accompanying the 1925 Act and subsequent versions have covered matters such as the 
duties of rescue station personnel, training standards, rescue procedures, rescue station facilities, 
equipment and vehicles and rescue facilities at the mines (Mines Rescue Board NSW, 1999). 
 
The current legislation controlling New South Wales mines rescue activities is the Coal Industry Act 
2001, through which the Mines Rescue Act 1994 was repealed. The former Mines Rescue Board was 
dissolved under this legislation, replaced by the provision for one or more companies to provide a range 
of health and safety services, including mines rescue functions (New South Wales Government, 2009). 
Coal Services Pty Ltd is the current “approved company” under this legislation, with its subsidiary Mines 
Rescue Pty Ltd being the current “mines rescue company”. 
 
The Coal Industry Act 2001 notes the mines rescue company has the following principal mines rescue 
functions in connection with underground coal mines in the State: making available rescue services and 
facilities to deal with emergencies in those mines and, in particular, ensuring that the (Mines Rescue) 
Brigade has the capacity to deal with any such emergencies; ensuring that adequate rescue equipment 
(such as breathing apparatus) is available to enable members of the Brigade to deal with emergencies 
in those mines; training members of the Brigade in mine rescue procedures at those mines and, in 
particular, in the use of breathing apparatus; establishing appropriate procedures and arrangements for 
ensuring the mobilisation of members of the Brigade and the supply of rescue equipment in response to 
emergencies in those mines; ensuring that persons with an adequate knowledge of mine rescue work 
are available to provide technical advice to the owners of those mines if emergencies should arise in 
those mines (New South Wales Government, 2009).  
 
Other Australian States and Overseas 
 
It is acknowledged that mines rescue organisations for other states in Australia (Tasmania, Victoria and 
Western Australia) and overseas have been formed and in many instances continue to service their 
areas. This paper focuses on New South Wales and Queensland mines rescue organisations servicing 
their states’ underground coal mining industries, as underground coal mining (and associated legislated 
rescue capability) in Australia outside of these states is limited. 
MINES RESCUE GUIDELINES: THE PAST 
The term guideline in relation to mines rescue organisations is used to capture the operating 
procedures, protocols and standards endorsed and used in both training and emergency response by 
the Queensland and New South Wales mines rescue organisations. While the guidelines encompass 
some strict boundaries within which mines rescue members, managers, superintendents and 
associated mines rescue personnel must operate, the term also reflects that there are aspects of 
operation that must be adapted to suit the particular incident or training exercise. 
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Emergency responses in the mining industry have been conducted over many centuries, but formal 
guidelines are a relatively recent development. The first recorded use of breathing apparatus for rescue 
in a mine was at the Seaham Pit Disaster, North-East England, 1880. An updated version of these 
Fleuss breathing apparatus was used in the recovery of bodies following the Mount Kembla Disaster in 
1902 (Hanrahan, 2009), necessitating training in the use of the apparatus. 
 
Mining disasters, advances in technology and research appear to have been the biggest drivers of 
guideline development and revision for the New South Wales and Queensland mines rescue 
organisations, supplemented by learnings from training and emergency exercises and the formal and 
informal communications between mines rescue organisations.  
 
Some significant drivers of guideline development include:  
 
 Disasters preceding legislation and formal rescue organisations for Queensland and New 
South Wales: Bulli Colliery (1887), Mount Kembla (1902), Stanford Merthyr Colliery (1902) 
and Bellbird Colliery (1923); 
 The 1972 Box Flat No. 7 Colliery major explosion, near Ipswich, Queensland. 18 men were 
fatally injured, including mines rescue members, following efforts to fight an underground fire; 
 The 1975 Kianga No. 1 Mine underground explosion, southern Bowen Basin, Queensland, 
following a spontaneous combustion event. 13 men were fatally injured; 
 The 1986 Moura No.4 explosion, southern Bowen Basin, Queensland. 12 men were fatally 
injured in an underground explosion attributed to an ignition caused by a flame safety lamp; 
 The 1994 Moura No. 2 Mine explosion, southern Bowen Basin, Queensland,. 11 men were 
fatally injured due to an underground explosion attributed to spontaneous combustion behind 
a recently sealed section of the mine; 
 The advent and implementation of successive generations of breathing apparatus, including 
the Fleuss breathing apparatus and Dräger BG174 and BG4 units; 
 Updated portable gas monitoring devices for more rapid and accurate analyses of mine 
environments; and 
 The implementation of emergency exercises in the Queensland underground coal mining 
industry, notably the annual industry-wide “Level 1” exercises since 1998. 
 
Each disaster and emergency exercise has brought about a host of recommendations that have been 
incorporated into mines rescue guidelines.  
MINES RESCUE GUIDELINES: THE PRESENT 
The inquiry following the Moura No. 2 Mine explosion of 1994 triggered significant legislative changes 
for the coal mining industry. One of the most critical changes was the adoption of management plans 
and procedures, underpinned by risk assessments. Risk management was formally becoming 
entrenched in the coal mining industry, driven by the need for risk to a person from coal mining 
operations to be at an acceptable level, defined for Queensland coal mining operations as being within 
acceptable limits and as low as reasonable achievable (section 29, Queensland Government, 2009a). 
 
Risk Management in Mines Rescue 
 
While the majority of the protocols by which mines rescue operations are undertaken in New South 
Wales and Queensland remained the same, rescue efforts from the late 1990s began to incorporate 
risk management, and particularly formal risk assessments, as part of undertaking emergency 
responses. The guidelines for the New South Wales and Queensland mines rescue services captured 
the need to risk assess specific emergency responses while the guidelines set the boundaries for 
rescue operations. The controls in the guidelines however were not subject at this stage to a formal risk 
assessment. 
 
Given the co-operative spirit between the two states’ rescue organisations, similarities in the apparent 
intent of legislation and the same hazards being present across the underground coal mining industries 
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for the two states, it is not too surprising that there are many similarities in the mines rescue guidelines 
from the New South Wales and Queensland mines rescue services.  
 
The intent section of the Queensland Mines Rescue Service guidelines notes: “Mines Rescue 
guidelines are achieved with the underpinning risk management philosophy in all that is done to 
minimise and mitigate the challenges, hazards and threats to personnel. However the nature of the 
underground coal mine environment and situations in which mines rescue teams are called to operate, 
these guidelines only serve to give direction and guide the decision making process. Decisions are 
made within risk management practices and therefore are taken by the team leader and team to 
achieve objectives within the framework of risk based logic. These guidelines serve as a guide to that 
process” (Queensland Mines Rescue Service Limited, 2007). 
 
The intent section of the New South Wales Mines Rescue guidelines notes: “These guidelines have 
been developed through detailed risk assessments and consultation with industry and mines rescue 
experts both within Australian and Overseas. Ongoing annual reviews will be conducted taking into 
account underground mine emergencies, simulated emergencies and general application of the 
guidelines to ensure that they remain both functional and practical. Due to the number of variables in an 
underground coal mine emergency situation the procedures and limits / barriers in the guidelines may 
not always be appropriate or practical. Should this occur then IMT  [Incident Management Team] and 
MRS [Mines Rescue Service] officers must adopt a documented risk management approach 
referencing the guidelines to identify likely risks associated with the proposed operation / actions and 
the barriers to be implemented” (Mines Rescue Pty Ltd, 2009). 
 
The intents in these guidelines clearly point to the use of risk management, and specifically the use of 
documented risk assessment tools, as part of mines rescue.  
 
Risk Management: Mines Rescue Guidelines 
 
Queensland coal mining legislation can be interpreted as requiring the same application of risk 
management processes for mines rescue procedures (which would include the guidelines) as is 
required for the development of procedures for operations. By virtue of the mines rescue agreement 
stating procedures (such as “the operational procedures developed by the accredited corporation to be 
followed by the corporation in carrying out the mines rescue services at the mine”) and links to each 
operation’s Emergency Response Principal Hazard Management Plan, the Queensland Mines Rescue 
Service guidelines can be considered a part of each operation’s Safety and Health Management 
System. This is further reinforced by the Queensland Coal Mining Safety and Health Regulation 2001 
(refer sections 359, 360, 366) where the use of mines rescue trained personnel, with mines rescue 
equipment and working under mines rescue procedures, can enter irrespirable atmospheres. 
 
Following this principle, and in the absence of specific regulations or recognised standards, safety and 
health obligations for mines rescue can only be discharged by taking reasonable precautions and 
exercising proper diligence (section 38, Queensland Government, 2009a). Underpinning mines rescue 
guidelines with formal, documented risk assessments is an effective way of demonstrating reasonable 
precautions have been taken and proper diligence has been exercised. 
 
While the above has focussed on Queensland Mines Rescue Service guidelines satisfying Queensland 
legislation, the same conclusions can be drawn for New South Wales Mines Rescue guidelines with 
reference to Duty of Care provisions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2001 and the need 
for “emergency management systems” under the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 2002 (refer sections 
44-47). 
MINES RESCUE GUIDELINE REVIEW: EMERGENCY MINE ENTRY/RE-ENTRY 
A core mines rescue activity is that of entering or re-entering a mine as part of an emergency response: 
the emergency mine entry/re-entry. While there are many aspects of the mines rescue guidelines to 
which risk management philosophy can be applied, the emergency mine entry/re-entry is such a crucial 
and wide-reaching aspect of mines rescue operations, with significant overlaps with how operations 
manage their principal hazards and emergency responses, that underpinning emergency mine entry/re-
entry processes with risk management will have significant benefits and is a logical starting point for a 
fundamental review of mines rescue guidelines.  
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The review of emergency mine entry/re-entry activity was partly in response to the recommendation 
from the report for the 2007 Queensland Level 1 Exercise (held at Grasstree Mine) that the Queensland 
Mines Rescue Service “should formalise the guidelines by using a risk based approach to develop a set 
of mine re-entry TARPS based on explosibility rather than percentage of UEL and LEL of explosive 
gases” (Alexopoulos et al, 2007). 
 
It is important to note that although there is considerable overlap between information essential for 
emergency mine entry/re-entry and a “no lives at risk” mine entry/re-entry, risk tolerance and planning 
processes would differ as recognised in the New South Wales Mines Rescue guidelines: “The re-entry 
and exploration within a mine for the recovery of bodies or restoration of operations is not normally 
considered an emergency situation. These activities should be a pre-planned operation, using a risk 
management approach (with reference to the guidelines to identify the likely risks associated with the 
proposed operation), and under the direction of mine management” (Mines Rescue Pty Ltd, 2009). 
 
Phase I: Risk Assessment 
 
The first stage of reviewing the emergency mine entry/re-entry process was a thorough and 
comprehensive risk assessment involving relevant industry stakeholders. The risk assessment team 
initially undertook a brainstorming process to assist with identifying the potential hazards or barriers 
which could prevent a mines rescue team entering a mine or part of a mine considered dangerous to 
coal mine workers. While the brainstorm process identified a number of external barriers which could 
prevent re-entry, the team consciously focused on the potential hazards and barriers existing at a mine, 
in what the team regarded as known-unknown information (unquantified hazards) to the rescuers and 
decision makers (Incident Control Team).  
 
From the brainstorm process, twelve critical hazards were identified for the risk assessment team to 
analyse, specifically for how they could occur and why they would occur. The risk assessment 
techniques that were used to assist in the process were a customised semi-quantitative risk 
assessment tool based on the Minerals Industry Risk Management Guidelines and Queensland Mines 
and Energy Recognised Standard 02 (“Control of Risk Management Practices”). Due to the risk 
assessment not being mine specific, the team agreed that no current controls would be applied which 
therefore ranked all hazards as extreme. Proposed controls and hazard specific barriers where then 
provided by the group for each hazard to mitigate its risk. 
 
This process was completed through a major industry risk assessment conducted over four days, 
facilitated by the Queensland Mines Rescue Service (QMRS), with participation from: the NSW Mines 
Rescue (NSWMR); Queensland Department of Mines and Energy (now Queensland Mines Energy, 
part of the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation); the Construction, 
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) Industrial Safety and Health Representatives; Simtars, 
mines rescue volunteers and third party industry stake holders. The assessment reviewed key hazards 
and addressed specific issues in relation to the deployment of mines rescue crews in emergencies. It 
was highlighted by the risk assessment that mine hazards must be able to be assessed accurately and 
efficiently, not only to determine and analyse what is known, but to identify what (if any) further 
information is required for sufficient understanding of mine conditions to the level necessary for sound, 
risk-management based deployment and management of resources. 
 
This phase of the guideline review was completed November 2008. 
 
Phase II: Guideline Development 
 
The second phase, developing the Mine Entry/Re-Entry Guideline, is in progress. The objective here is 
to develop the results and controls from the risk assessment into a guideline incorporating checklists 
and flow charts for emergency mine re-entry. The intention is to establish a tool which can be utilised by 
both mines rescue services and operations with the aim of efficient and effective management of 
emergency responses.  
 
A task group, the Mine Re-Entry Task Group, was formed early in 2009 to develop a framework for the 
implementation of action items from the Mine Entry/Re-entry Risk Assessment. The core members of 
the task group are: Geoff Nugent (Queensland Mines Rescue Service), Seamus Devlin (New South 
Wales Mines Rescue), Darren Brady (Simtars), Assoc Prof David Cliff (Minerals Industry Safety and 
Health Centre, Sustainable Minerals Institute, University of Queensland) and John Grieves (New Hope 
Corporation Limited). 
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Under the guidance of the task group, a guideline is being developed, supported by checklists and 
flowcharts, for knowledge management in the event of an emergency. This guideline will detail what 
information is required to support an emergency response and how such information can be attained. 
Part of this guideline development is to scope opportunities for software and hardware solutions 
suitable for emergency response for the management of information, and to test draft guidelines at 
emergency exercises. 
 
Specific actions within this second phase are: 
 
1. Classifying the controls from the Risk Assessment: 
 Identify responsibility for collection/interpretation of information (site, mines rescue, 
external provider); 
 Determine the ability to collect and maintain information prior to a response; 
 Determine the information type eg automatic generation, manual collection; and 
 Determine the information importance to assessment of risk i.e. Rank its level of criticality. 
2. Conducting post-mortems of previous emergencies and emergency exercises applying controls 
from the risk assessment.  
3. Developing audit tools from the risk assessment to conduct gap analysis between what 
information/processes are commonly/typically available at an operation (Qld and NSW) and 
what is required to comply with developed guidelines. 
4. Seek key stakeholder feedback on draft guidelines via: Operators Forums (Qld and NSW); 
Queensland Safety & Health Conference presentation/workshop; Queensland Mines Rescue 
Service Technical Advisory Committee; New South Wales Mines Rescue Standards committee; 
and the Mine Managers Association of Australia. 
5. Disseminate guidelines to industry 
6. Test guidelines within Level 1 or 2 Emergency Exercise 
 
Release of the draft guideline is planned for first quarter 2010. 
The task group has conducted the classification process and developed an audit tool to conduct gap 
analyses at selected underground operations in Queensland and New South Wales. Gap analyses 
have been conducted at Anglo Coal Australia’s Moranbah North Colliery (Bowen Basin, Queensland), 
Peabody’s Metropolitan Colliery (Southern Coalfields NSW), Caledon’s Cook Colliery (Bowen Basin, 
Queensland), Rio Tinto’s Kestrel Mine (Bowen Basin, Queensland), Xstrata’s Tahmoor Colliery 
(Southern Coalfields NSW) and BHP Billiton’s Dendrobium Mine (Southern Coalfields NSW). 
Additionally the Task Group has conducted smaller assessments at Xstrata’s Oaky North Colliery 
(Queensland) and Centennial Coal’s Mandalong Colliery (NSW). 
 
Through these gap analyses, the task group has identified some common but important trends in 
relation to emergency response information management: 
 
 Information requested is captured but not readily available within an acceptable time; 
 The supply of critical (and sometimes basic) information is reliant on one or two key people 
being available; 
 Some information monitored is not understood by people monitoring; 
 Some required information (particularly for validation) is not monitored or measured at all. 
 
Gap Analyses Results 
 
The gap analyses have provided a wealth of information that assists with the development of the 
guidelines and provides examples of high quality systems that not only effectively manage principal 
hazards, but that also provide high levels of support in the event of an emergency response. Equally, 
the gap analyses have identified areas across a number of the operations where more effective 
systems would undoubtedly provide better management of principal hazards and superior results in the 
event of an emergency response. Many of these areas have been identified in previous Queensland 
Level 1 exercises. 
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Some examples of high quality systems worthy of consideration at all operations are: 
 
 Up-to-date registers of ventilation control devices, implemented under a regime of routine 
device inspections; 
 The use of a “process checker”, a person not directly involved in decision making and action 
taking, but auditing events against emergency response plan requirements, providing 
reminders to key personnel on necessary functions that may otherwise be missed; 
 Comprehensive mine environment and ventilation monitoring systems with redundancy and 
due regard for providing information to assist self-escape and aided-escape efforts – consider 
how a surface controller or control room operator knows where to direct those escaping from 
underground through the appropriate route; and 
 Thorough understanding of seam gas makes and behaviour including the impact on districts 
and whole of mine environment when change occurs through planned or unplanned 
ventilation interruptions and barometric influences. 
 
Common shortfalls in emergency response systems, generally also identified in previous Queensland 
Level 1 exercises, include: 
 
 Inconsistent debriefing processes that fail to capture or pass on information from key 
eyewitnesses; 
 Debriefing process does not utilise targeted questions to determine last known status of 
localised and general mine conditions such as ventilation and devices, manual atmospheric 
monitoring, other environmental conditions (eg visibility), roadways and panel layout.  
 Control room operators juggling multiple duty cards and under extreme time pressure;  
 Heavy reliance on technical people for appropriate responses (eg ventilation officers, 
electrical engineer) with little or no redundancy; 
 Fundamental information for status of the mine environment and systems are not 
automatically or manual maintained to convey the relevant information to emergency 
response teams in a clear and concise format. 
 Under utilisation, or lack of awareness, of some environmental monitoring software analysis 
capabilities to provide preset charting with trigger levels for less common ratios and trending 
rate of change, particularly for potential explosive atmospheres. 
 Limited consideration of current location, status and accessibility of other interconnecting 
airways (including boreholes) for use as alternative means of monitoring, communication and 
ventilation during an emergency. 
 General lack of recognition of specific sensor ranges for handheld, real-time and tube bundle 
monitoring systems (critically at control room operator and ventilation officer level), coupled 
with systems failing to indicate or alarm where sensors are returning results that are out of 
range; 
 Automated alarm settings inconsistent with triggers as specified in management plans and 
associated trigger action response plans (TARP); 
 
Informal feedback has been given to the operations at which the gap analysis has been conducted. 
MINES RESCUE GUIDELINES: THE FUTURE 
Phase III: Guideline Implementation 
 
The completion of constructing the Mine Entry/Re-Entry Guideline, supported by appropriate control 
check-sheets and checklists, represents a major step forward for mines rescue operations. Discussion 
and feedback on the draft guidelines will likely take the guideline development through to mid 2010. 
The effectiveness of the guidelines and how well the guidelines are incorporated into operations’ 
emergency response systems can be tested through the following: audits through mines rescue 
organisations; emergency exercises; mines rescue training exercises; and emergency responses. 
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The logical extension of this process is to continue the review process through the remainder of the 
mines rescue guidelines. 
 
While the guideline implementation focuses on emergency response, there are clear benefits to 
operations using guideline systems relevant to everyday operations and day-to-day management of 
principal hazards. Such opportunities for integrated systems, which promote familiarity for operators 
and management alike and give the best probability of effective emergency response, are obviously 
favoured. 
 
Critical Information Management: Implementing the Guidelines 
 
The Moura No. 2 Inquiry Task Group 4 (Mines Rescue Strategy Development) report stated: 
“Knowledge of conditions in a mine following an incident is essential in planning any rescue effort. 
Information systems must be provided to support implementation of the most appropriate rescue 
measures” (Moura No. 2 Inquiry Task Group No. 4, 1994). This same report contained the 
recommendation that “Industry should develop an effective computer-based emergency decision 
support system for incident management and training”. 
 
In the event of an underground coal mine emergency, the rapid and accurate collection of data relating 
to mine hazards and the efficient assessment of such data are crucial to the safe deployment and 
management of resources responding to such an event. Various reports and forums, including the 
September 2006 Queensland “Fight or Flight” Seminar, have recognised the first five hours of an 
emergency response as critical for implementing effective strategies for the best outcomes. Analysis of 
industry emergencies and emergency exercises has repeatedly proven that the site data required to 
determine an appropriate course of action post-incident and adequately assess the risks in effecting 
appropriate emergency responses is rarely available in a timely manner and suitable format. 
 
The Queensland Mines Rescue Service and New South Wales Mines Rescue, supported by the task 
group, have identified a suitable support project for guideline implementation: the “Emergency 
Response: Mine Entry Data Management” project. The Australian Coal Association Research Program 
(ACARP) supports this project (reference C19010) and further work will be forthcoming during 2010. 
ACARP project C19010 will commence in 2010. 
 
The aim of this project is to develop a functionnal specification for data collection and management 
systems suitable for the efficient, risk-assessed management of mine hazards in the event of an 
emergency response. The use of risk-management logic provides adequate control of risks in effecting 
emergency responses while maximising response efficiency. This project is targeting a quantum leap in 
information management for emergencies by the development of functional specifications for systems 
that facilitate the “Mine Entry/Re-entry Guideline”.  
 
The objectives of this project are to: develop a functional specification for an information collection and 
management system appropriate for efficient, effective implementation of the Mine Entry/Re-Entry 
Guidelines; and to raise industry awareness of Mine Entry/Re-Entry Guidelines and information 
collection and management systems appropriate for emergency responses. 
 
The “Emergency Response: Mine Entry Data Management” project differs from previous research 
undertaken in the emergency response area by linking risk-management logic underpinning Mines 
Rescue emergency response procedure development to site emergency response information 
requirements. The results from this project will be a targeted response to the key recommendation from 
the forthcoming ACARP C17008 Project (“Optimising the Collection of Information for Effective Use in 
the Event of an Emergency at an Underground Coal Mine”) report: “There is an urgent need to develop 
a guideline that identifies the scope and quality of information that is needed to effectively manage an 
emergency. This should [be] consistent industry-wide” (Cliff, 2009).  
 
The major benefits of this research are: industry will have relevant and functional specifications for 
information management systems that will offer clear directions for current and future mine monitoring 
and analysis systems so that information relevant to effecting an emergency response is readily 
available in suitable formats during a mine emergency;  information management systems will suit 
“Mine Entry/Re-entry Guidelines”; and a key priority for underground research from ACARP, “reviewing 
the adequacy and effectiveness of emergency response measures leading to practical solutions for 
industry implementation” will be researched. 
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Key components of this project to manage emergency response information management issues are: 
researching and developing software and hardware specifications (with paper based equivalents for 
sites where electronic systems are not justified); targeting information appropriate to specific incident 
types; and building on research completed to date (including systems such as ACARP funded 
integrated data management system NEXSYS – refer Rowan et al, 2007 – and the NERDDC funded 
expert computer software system ECAS – refer Nemes-Nemeth and Aubrey, 1991).  
 
The key risk areas for the project are: ensuring developed systems are appropriate for “Mine Entry/Re-
entry Guidelines”; and ensuring the development of useful, appropriate specifications that integrate with 
the variety of information management systems (paper and computer-based) already in utilised by 
operations. The experienced project leaders representing the key Queensland and New South Wales 
mines rescue organisations, combined with other key task group members, and the level of support 
offered from key industry stakeholders and operations minimise exposure of this project to these risks. 
 
Adoption of Guidelines by Industry 
 
Updating the guidelines is of little value if the results and key learnings are not disseminated to industry, 
or if the guidelines are not absorbed into the fabric of emergency response strategies within the coal 
mining industry.  
 
Efforts to achieve widespread adoption include: 
 
 The Mine Entry/Re-Entry guidelines will be incorporated into Queensland Mines Rescue 
Service and New South Wales Mines Rescue procedures, promoting standardisation; 
 Integrating the processes documented under the guideline and information management tools 
into existing industry emergency management training programs, such as the Queensland 
Mines Rescue Service’s Mine Emergency Management System (MEMS) and Coal Mines 
Qualifications Board Emergency Management Course; 
 Reviewing competency standards for emergency management and ventilation officers to 
identify opportunities for improvement based on the guideline and developed technology; and 
 Promoting guideline and information management tools through industry forums via 
presentations and workshops. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Emergency Mine Entry/Re-entry Task Group believes that the development of the Emergency 
Mine Entry/Re-entry Guideline, appropriately implemented and coupled with a knowledge management 
tool (founded on risk management logic), would significantly assist emergency responses and decision 
makers in real and simulated emergency situations through: 
 
 Taking reasonable precautions and demonstrating proper diligence in the decision making 
process; 
 Determining and understanding existing risk within a constrained time, promoting effective 
planning and strategies; 
 Developing and implementing plans and strategies that do not place rescuers at an 
unacceptable level of risk. 
 Minimising delay to rescue operations during information collection and assessment;  
 Reducing the likelihood of abandonment of any attempt of rescuing affected coal mine 
workers. 
 
The process of establishing the updated guidelines, underpinned by risk assessment, also facilitates 
the review process for future refinement. The information management systems have obvious benefits 
for day-to-day and routine operations in the management of any operation’s principal hazards. 
 
Completion of the processes outlined in this paper will mark a quantum leap forward in industry 
emergency response, emergency preparedness and information management. 
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